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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure; Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; UCA 78-2a-3(2)(f); and
by virtue of the fact that the case was poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to a letter dated September 26, 1994fromGeoffrey J. Butler directed to the Fourth District Court
Clerk of Utah County.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

A. Did the trial court commit error by refusing to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute
within 120 days? The standard of review is based upon a review of correctness of the trial court's
conclusions of law. No deference is accorded to the trial court State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1031
(Utah 1991).
B. Was the counsel afforded to the defendant ineffective? The standard of review is based
upon an objective standard of reasonableness. No deference is accorded to the trial court, Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
C. Was the evidence presented insufficient to support the verdict of the jury? The standard
of review is based upon a review of the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, State v.
Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1995).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Title 77, Chapter 29, Section 1, Subsections (1) and (4) are presented
for interpretation by this Court. Such subsections provide the following.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state,
and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate
agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition
of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days,
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the
proceeding, If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance
was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case. This case involves a conviction of the defendant/appellant of an
attempted burglary and the possession of a weapon by a restricted person. Defendant was
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison during all relevant times of the proceedings. Accordingly,
Defendant demanded that he have the charge brought to trial within 120 days. The trial was delayed
by a motionfromthe prosection. Defendant's attorney brought a motion to dismiss the case which
was denied by the trial court.
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At trial, the defendant's counsel demonstrated that he did not have a proper knowledge of the
rules of evidence and was admonished by the Court. In addition, defendant's counsel failed to bring
a motion to suppress and/or brought the motion in an improper fashion.
Finally, defendant has requested that this court review the evidence. Defendant feels that the
evidence of identification was insufficient to support the verdict.
B. The course of the proceedings. Defendant's motion to dismiss was brought on the
morning of trial. The trial court refused to hear the motion at the time of trial, but gave leave to
defendant's counsel tofilethe motion upon the completion of trial. Upon conclusion of the evidence,
the jury found the defendant guilty of (1) Aggravated Burglary and (2) Possession of a Weapon by
a Restricted Person.
Following trial, counsel for the defendant filed his motion to dismiss on the basis of the court's
failure to complete prosecution of the case within 120 days. The trial court denied the motion
pursuant to a memorandum decision.
C. Statement of facts. On September 14,1993, after conclusion of the preliminary hearing,
defendant requested that his counsel prepare a demand for disposition of pending charges. His
attorney prepared a hand written demand which was signed and delivered to the transporting officer
from the Utah State Prison with the directive that he deliver it to his supervisor (R, at 149 and 150).
On October 18, defendant, acting pro se, prepared an Affidavit of Impecuniosity and Demand
for 120 Day Disposition and gave the documents to prison officials along with a request that they be
mailed to the Fourth District Court. However, prison officials refused to mail the documents as
directed, on the basis that the defendant did not have the money to pay for postage. The documents
were, however, mailed to the Utah County Public Defender Association at no charge. Upon receipt
3

of the Demand for 120 Day Disposition and Affidavit of Impecuniosity, the Utah County Public
Defender Association mailed the documents to June Hinckley, the record's officer at the Utah State
Prison, with a cover letter dated October 27, 1993 (R, at 150).
On October 28, 1993, Defendant was arraigned before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on the
charges of Aggravated Burglary and Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person. Defendant
entered a not guilty plea and requested a trial setting. A jury trial was set to commence on November
8th and 9th of 1993 (R, at 16 and 17).
On November 4, 1993, the prosecutorfileda motion to continue the trial setting. The motion
was based upon the fact that State had been unable to locate an "essential witness", Diane Leroy, the
trial court granted the states motion even though the State never called Ms. Leroy as a witness at the
eventual trial (R, at 22 and 23).
A new trial date was scheduled for February 7th and 8th of 1994 (R, at 44).
On November 15,1993, June Hinckley sent a memorandum to the defendant, with an official
form used by the prison to file a Demand for 120 Day Disposition. On November 18, 1993, the
Defendant signed a Utah Department of Corrections Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charges. The form was delivered to prison officials on the date it was signed by the defendant, but
the form was not received by June Hinckley until December 7, 1993. None of the above referenced
documents were ever forwarded to the trial court. (R, at 150).
On January 20, 1994, the State once again moved for a continuance. The grounds for the
continuance were the same as the first motion for continuance, that being that an essential witness
for the State would be unavailable for trial (R, at 43).
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The trial court granted the State's motion and reset the trial for March 28th and 29th of 1994
(R, at 46).
It is interesting to note that the State filed a third motion for continuance on March 13, 1994
based upon the grounds that its investigating officer would be out of town. Such motion, however,
was denied (R, at 53).
The trialfinallycommenced on March 28, 1994. During the trial, defense counsel improperly
attempted to read a statement in order to refresh a witness1 memory. The state failed to object yet
the trial court admonished defense counsel in the presence of the jury that he was proceeding
improperly and informed defense counsel of the proper procedure to refresh a witness' memory (T,
at 68).
During the trial defense counsel attempted to make a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack
of evidence at the conclusion of the state's case in chief. This attempt was made infrontof the jury
and defense counsel was admonished by the trial court that this was improper ((T, at 166).
Defense counsel waited until the jury was in deliberations to make what was ultimately
interpreted as an effort to suppress evidence which motion was denied (T, at 219).
Troy Thomas, a witness of the state, testified that he had narrowed the selection to two
people and then "picked someone else" when he was identifying the defendant at the lineup. Defense
counsel failed to probe into the selection process or why Mr. Thomas had changed his mind (T, at
76).
Sherry Nostrom, a state witness, could not identify the defendant from the photo line-up (T,
at 84).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UCA 77-29-1 requires that a written demand be made to a custodial officer to initiate the 120
day statutory disposition of the case. Defendant complied with the statute though the state prison
system did not follow through with his request and defendant was not tried within 120 days.
Defendant brought a motion to dismiss based upon the state's failure to insure prosecution within 120
days. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that defendant was brought to trial within 120
days after his compliance with UCA 77-29-1 and on the basis that it was proper for the trial court to
grant continuances to the state.
Defendant further argues that he was not provided with competent counsel as his counsel did
not properly make a motion to dismiss at the close of the state's case and failed to bring a motion to
suppress. The prejudice that resulted to the defendant surrounds the fact that the attempt to make
the motion was made infrontof the jury.
Defendant finally argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This
argument is based upon the fact that the only two witnesses to the attempted robbery could not
adequately identify him.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE. DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROSECUTED WITHIN 120 DAYS AS
REQUIRED BY UCA 77-29-1.
UCA 77-29-1 requires, inter alia, that a "written demand" be made to a "custodial officer" of
"agent" of the same. There is no official form or petition that must be filed to initiate the 120 day
statutory disposition of the case. In each of the instances cited in the statement of facts, the defendant
6

POINT TWO.

THE COUNSEL AFFORDED TO THE DEFENDANT WAS

INEFFECTIVE.
During the
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' o dismiss the case prejudiced the defendant. The jury may have based its verdict not so much

on the evidence, but on the basis of the defense counsel's performance.
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presented a written demand which clearly established his intent to avail himself of the privilege of a
the statute. In addition, all of the documents referenced in the statement of facts were delivered to
the custodial officer of the defendant or an appropriate agent of the same as required by UCA 77-291.
The state had 120 days to bring the case to trial unless the court entered a finding of "good
cause" for a longer delay. The is nothing in the record that constitutes good cause for the excessive
delay. The state requested continuances to all three trial settings. The first two requests were
granted. It is apparent that the requests were nothing more than a delay tactic by the state inasmuch
as the "essential witness" that was allegedly unavailable on the first trial setting was not even called
as a witness at the eventual trial.
In State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that the burden
of complying with UCA 77-29-1 was on the prosecution. The Court further held that the defendant
was not required to show that he had been prejudiced by the delay. The Court held that if there is
not good cause for the delay of the trial beyond the statutory time period, then the case must be
dismissed with prejudice.
In this case, the request was delivered initially to the transportation officer and later to June
Hinckley. There is not statutory definition of an "appropriate agent" or "custodial officer" as those
words are used in UCA 77-29-1. In State v. Phathammovong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993), the
court stated that is would not reach a definition of "appropriate agent" because the issue was not
properly presented at the trial court. Thus, in the present case, the Court should apply the plain
meaning of those words in determining whether or not the defendant filed an appropriate request.
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CONCLUSION

Defendant v

J within 120 days after he had delivered his written demand

to his custodial agent The trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss on this basis.
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representation afforded to defendant was inadequate as defense counsel made several mistakes that
prejudiced defendant. Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict inasmuch as
defendant was not properly identified as the individual who attempted the robbery.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 1995.

DavidTC. Cundick
Attorney for defendant/appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the appellant's brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jan
Graham, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 10th day of July,
1995.
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